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Introduction 
 
In a previous issue of this journal Fred Grünfeld argues1 that while lawyers fail 
to take into account social reality once a legal norm has been determined, 
international relations scholars “skip the norm” and research social reality.2 On 
the basis of the subsequent demonstrations, Grünfeld contended (quite 
rightly) that lawyers and social scientists are not familiar with each other’s 
work, while studying the same phenomena, although in “different phases”. He, 
however, argues that such division should be kept in place and lawyers and 
social scientists should remain working separately. 
 
In this reply, I will address both the empirical elements of Grünfeld’s argument 
as well as his substantive argument of keeping the two disciplines separated. In 
the remainder of the article, I will engage Grünfeld’s demonstrations related to 
the research on norms in international relations (IR), methods of social science, 
and the cause and effect distinction in both. In particular, I will argue that not 
only can the work of lawyers and social scientists be mutually enriching, but 
also that new methods should be tried so that new findings can be reached. 
 
I. Norms and Rules, Lawyers and IR Scholars 
 
Grünfeld argues that it is inconceivable to lawyers that states endorse a norm,3 
by accession to a treaty for example, and then violate it. 4 This argument holds 
as long as we speak of practising lawyers. Practising lawyers would argue that 
not only are states bound by the Vienna Convention to enter into their 
international obligations in good faith, but as the International Court of Justice 
recently ruled “there is no reason to suppose that a State whose act or conduct 
                                                 
* Michal Onderco is a doctoral researcher at VU University Amsterdam. His research 
deals with responses to norm deviance in international relations. He is a former editor 
and current member of the advisory board of this journal.  
1 Based on F. Coomans, F. Grünfeld, and M. T. Kamminga (eds.), Methods of Human 
Rights Research, Antwerp & Portland: Intersentia 2009.  
2 F. Grünfeld, ‘International Law and International Relations: Norm and reality or 
Viceversa’, Amsterdam Law Forum 2011-3, pp. 3-14.  
3 What Grünfeld understands as a “norm”, the social scientist would call a rule. A 
quick and dirty difference between rules and norms is that rules are written and 
codified (in a treaty or an agreement), whereas norms transcend rules because they 
have a social significance and thus provide boundaries which are flexible and open to 
interpretation.  
4 Cf. J.D. Fearon, 'Signaling Foreign Policy Interests', Journal of Conflict Resolution 
1997-1, pp. 68-90; C. Reus-Smit, 'The Constitutional Structure of International Society 
and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions', International Organization, 1997- 4, pp. 
555-589. 
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has been declared wrongful by the Court will repeat that act or conduct in the 
future *…+”,5 extending the belief in the good faith. Grünfeld’s assertion is 
therefore understandable. 
 
The example put forward, which the author argues to be an original thought, is 
however remarkably similar to research done by international relations 
scholars. Grünfeld could have also pointed to similar arguments made by 
Moravcsik (on the European Court of Human Rights) or Simmons and Danner 
(on the International Criminal Court).6 When Grünfeld argues that research on 
non-compliance with the convention against torture is a surprising research 
topic for lawyers, he ignores an important body of international legal 
scholarship that deals particularly with this compliance.7 Moreover, 
international relations scholars have explored compliance (and non-
compliance) through arguments based on bargaining, regime and game 
theories.8  
 
II. Till Method Us Do Part  
 
Grünfeld’s argument on method is twofold. First, he engages what he calls 
“scientific distance”, arguing that international relations scholars9 as well as 
lawyers lack scientific distance, meaning the distance between researcher and 
his subject, when researching fields such as “foreign policy, human rights and 
issues relating to peace and security.”10 Second, he argues that the 
quantitative obsession of social scientists leads to distortion of facts because it 
attempts to quantify reality, thereby necessarily simplifying it. 
 
If the “scientific distance” argument is valid, social science is in serious trouble. 
Grünfeld argues that human rights scholars tend to get too personally 
connected with their research subject, associating an advancement agenda 
with research. If that were true, the implications of such a lack of scientific 
distance would run counter to the recommendations for the conduct of 
research in the social sciences. Save for critical-theory and Marxist-inspired 
                                                 
5 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties; Navigational and Related Rights 
(Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), ICJ 2009, para. 150.  
6 A. Moravcsik, 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in 
Postwar Europe', International Organization 2000-2, pp. 217-252; B.A. Simmons and 
A. Danner, 'Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court', International 
Organization 2010-2, pp. 225-256. 
7 Such as H.H. Koh, 'Why Do Nations Obey International Law?', The Yale Law Journal 
1997-8, pp. 2599-2659. 
8 For a recent overview, cf. B. Simmons, 'Treaty Compliance and Violation', Annual 
Review of Political Science 2010-1, pp. 273-296. 
9 Grünfeld uses the terms “social scientists” and “political scientists” interchangeably, 
although in his introductory paragraph he actually limits his case to the realist school 
of international relations. Unless explicitly stated, I will argue from the point of view of 
international relations, without any particular theoretical inclination. 
10 F. Grünfeld, ‘International Law and International Relations: Norm and reality or Vice 
versa’, Amsterdam Law Forum 2011-3, p. 4. 
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researchers,11 social scientists have been asked to keep as much distance as 
possible from the subject of their research.12  
 
Nevertheless, the situation is not so dire. When it comes to political science 
the argument that scientists keep little scientific distance is ill-founded, 
because that is a contradiction in terms. If social scientists, as Grünfeld argues 
in his second methodological remark, really distinguish themselves by the use 
of quantitative methods13 (which the present author doubts heavily), then 
scientific distance is certainly not lacking. There is hardly a more impersonal 
way of engaging with the material than through a maze of numbers in 
matrices. When it comes to qualitative social science, researchers are not only 
encouraged to choose subjects they are not emotional about,14 but the existing 
qualitative research methods and policies of most professional journals inhibit 
such instances. 
 
On the other hand, Grünfeld’s argument bears relevance when it comes to 
research on international norms. Indeed the result of research there has been 
the highlighting of the advances in the human rights promotion. The existing 
constructivist research on international norms has focused too much on the 
successful examples of positive norms.15 However, even research on human 
rights, whether qualitative or quantitative, still does not qualify under the lack 
of scientific distance described by Grünfeld. 16 
 
                                                 
11 Guided by Marx’s famous quote "Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden 
interpretiert; es kommt aber darauf an, sie zu verändern", in K. Marx, ‘Thesen Über 
Feuerbach’, at:  http://www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/marx-
engels/1845/thesen/thesfeue.htm (accessed on 15 December 2011). 
12 G.R.O. King and S. Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1994.  
13 Which he equates with the social science methodology, ignoring important 
advances made in qualitative social science methods, cf. J. Gerring, Case Study 
Research: Principles and Practices, New York: Cambridge University Press 1997; A.L. 
George and A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 2005.  
14 W.L. Neuman, Social Science Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches, Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon 2003.  
15 J.T. Checkel, ‘Review: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', 
World Politics 1998-2, pp. 324-348; P. Kowert and J. Legro, 'Norms, Identity, and Their 
Limits: A Theoretical Reprise', In: P.J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National 
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press 
1996, pp. 451-497.  
16 Examples of qualitative research include (but are by far not limited to) M. 
Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University 
Press 1996; A. Klotz, Norms in International Relation : The Struggle against Apartheid, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995;  T. Risse, S. C. Ropp, and K. Sikkink (eds.), The 
Power of Human Rights: International Norms an Domestic Change, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1999. Quantitative research may be exemplified by R.C. 
Carpenter, 'Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and the Paradox of 
Weapons Norms', International Organization, 2011-1, pp. 69-102. 
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The charge that social scientists oversimplify reality in their attempts of 
quantification is the most serious put forward by Grünfeld. He argues that 
international legal scholars and international relations scholars both use 
“highly different methods”,17 precluding their mutual cooperation. His 
argument is that while lawyers focus on “what ‘ought to be’”,18 social scientists 
are bound to observe social reality in ways that distort reality. Grünfeld takes 
particular issue with the operationalisation of phenomena for processing in a 
quantitative way, which he believes to distort reality.  
 
The opinion that law studies what ‘ought to be’ is relevant only as long as we 
remain in the world of legal positivism19 and practice. Much of the research in 
international law has been about the social drivers and effects of legal practice. 
The law, as a social construct, exemplifies (and shapes) social reality in the 
community where it arises. As such, it serves as a useful lens to study the 
community. Through such a lens, legal scholarship has successfully studied 
phenomena related to real-world politics without losing its legal focus.20 Even 
in positivist studies, the study of empirical phenomena such as existing case 
law or treaty interpretation has transcended the normative aspects and in fact 
focused on wider interpretation. 
 
The operationalisation of phenomena for quantitative inquiry is just a different 
step in the traditional social science methodology. We can understand 
operationalisation, apart from dummy coding,21 as an exercise in dividing a line 
between two opposite Gedankenbilder.22 How does a country’s democracy 
score on a scale from -10 to 1023? How corrupt is the country on a scale from 0 
to 1024? How developed is it, on a scale from 0 to 125? In each case, we know 
fairly precisely what we wish to study and how the results of a unit compare to 
other units. If the purpose of social science is to advance towards generalisable 
                                                 
17 F. Grünfeld, ‘International Law and International Relations: Norm and reality or Vice 
versa’, Amsterdam Law Forum 2011-3, p. 7.  
18 Ibid., p. 8. (Parenthesis in original).  
19 While Grünfeld argues that he takes legal positivism as the representative of legal 
scholarship, such argument is hardly defensible (as legal positivism is only one of 
many schools in legal scholarship), once he starts making arguments about ‘legal 
scholarship’.  
20 For example, cf. T.M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, Oxford & 
New York: Oxford University Press 1990; R.H.M. Pierik and W. Werner (eds.), 
Cosmopolitanism in Context: Perspectives from International Law and Political Theory, 
Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press 2010. 
21 Dummy coding is a way to code group membership or other social phenomena 
using only zeroes and ones (no or yes).  
22 M. Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, New York: Simon & Schuster 
1949. 
23 M.G. Marshall, T.R. Gurr, and K. Jaggers, Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2009, at: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
24 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, at: 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/. 
25 UNDP, Human Development Index 2011, at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/. 
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conclusions, then we cannot do without comparisons. Social scientists thus do 
not distort reality but attempt to describe it in ways that are roughly 
comparable across time and space.  
 
Grünfeld’s criticism of the use of proxy measures by international relations 
scholars is related to this issue. He, however, does not recognise that proxies, 
if well constructed, are actually very helpful in studying empirical 
phenomena.26 If human rights give individuals certain rights (right to health, 
right to education, etc.), the (mal)-performance of states in the sphere of 
human rights can be actually measured quite well.27 
 
III. Causes, Effects and Concerns 
 
Grünfeld closes with the argument that while law is a cause-oriented field, 
political science is an effect-oriented one. He justifies this proposition by 
looking at sanctions research, arguing that “*l+awyers look back *…+ to the point 
where the legal norm was violated and connect the legal consequence of the 
sanction to it”, whereas international relations scholars look at “the most 
effective way *…+ to force the state to change its behaviour.”28 
 
Such an argument is misguided. What Grünfeld equates with causality, namely 
tracing the United Nations Security Council sanctions to norm violations, in 
reality is nothing but a mechanism. Mechanisms do not cause events to 
happen, but are only the link (trajectory) between the cause and the effect. If 
mechanism equated to cause (what Grünfeld implies), the UN Security Council 
would work like a stack of dominoes. If every time the dominoes fell (UN 
Security Council sanctions) would be caused by a push, namely a violation of a 
norm, then every push would also cause the fall of all dominoes. Every norm 
                                                 
26 K.A. Clarke and D.M. Primo, A model discipline: political science and the logic of 
representations, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press 2011.  
27 For a recent methodological discussion, cf. G. Goertz, 'Concepts, Theories, and 
Numbers: A Checklist for Constructing, Evaluating and Using Concepts or Quantitative 
Measures', In: J.M. Box-Steffensmeier, H. E. Brady and D. Collier (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Methodology, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 2010, pp. 97-
118. For an example, cf. N.A. Englehart, 'State Capacity, State Failure, and Human 
Rights', Journal of Peace Research 2009-2, pp. 163-180; E. Neumayer, 'Do 
International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?' Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 2005-6, pp. 925-953. 
28 Grünfeld argues that political scientists do not look at sanctions as punishment but 
as a coercive measure. There is, however, a growing body of literature that suggests 
sanctions ought to be conceived not only as punishment but they serve more as a 
signaling device (of unacceptability of actions). Cf. G.J. Hufbauer, J. J. Schott, and K. A. 
Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (3rd ed.), Washington, DC: Peterson Institute 
for International Economics 2007; D.J. Lektzian and C. M. Sprecher, 'Sanctions, Signals, 
and Militarized Conflict', American Journal of Political Science 2007-2, pp. 415-431; 
K.R. Nossal, 'International Sanctions as International Punishment', International 
Organization 1989-2, pp. 301-322. 
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violation would be met with action of the UN Security Council29. But we know 
the UN Security Council does not work this way.  
 
Neither international relations scholars nor legal scholars can establish 
causality by looking at violations of existing rules, or norms, in Grünfeld’s 
language, alone. There is always an important social dimension which 
distinguishes some rule violations from others. If we were to establish causality 
by looking at rule violations, reverse tracing would not be possible – for not all 
rule violations, even of the same rule, lead to sanctions. There are many 
explanations for this, including power status, alliance patterns, and economic 
interdependence, but the key is to look at social reality. If there is any 
difference between positivist legal scholars and international relations 
scholars, then it is that the former focus on the rule violation itself, whereas 
the latter look at the complex reality.  
 
IV. It Takes Two to Tango 
 
In this final section, I want to take issue with Grünfeld’s wider argument that 
lawyers and international relations scholars are better off in their separate 
disciplines and their separate methodologies. While Grünfeld concedes that 
the two fields should communicate more, he strongly argues against 
intermingling. Such argument is, however, short-sighted. Whenever we look at 
legal factors in international politics, we should take both law and politics into 
account. If we wish to study legal phenomena, we cannot be successful unless 
we integrate politics and law. The law is shaped by the social world and the 
shape of the law sheds light on the transformation of the social world. The 
interrelation is confounded by the fact that many concepts are dealt with by 
both lawyers and international relations scholars. A prime example is the 
notion of sovereignty, which forms both the core of the international legal 
order and is a key concept in international relations theory.30 When joining the 
legal and IR positions, we gather useful insights into the transformation of the 
concept of sovereignty.31 The effect is not only one-way. International politics 
are heavily restrained by law and law shapes international politics. War, the 
main preoccupation of international relations scholars, is heavily legally 
constrained. Many political scientists study how the law constrains or co-
shapes politics.32 
                                                 
29 Similar to the fact that every gentle push against the first domino leads to the fall of 
the last domino. 
30 H. Kelsen, 'Sovereignty and International Law', The Georgetown Law Journal 1960-4, 
pp. 627-640; S.D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press 1999.  
31 T.E. Aalberts and W. Werner, 'Mobilising Uncertainty and the Making of Responsible 
Sovereigns', Review of International Studies 2011-5, pp. 2183-2200. 
32 F. Kratochwil, 'Has The "Rule of Law" Become A "Rule of Lawyers"?', In: F. 
Kratochwil (ed.), The Puzzles of Politics: Inquiries into the Genesis and Transformation 
of International Relations, Abingdon: Routledge 2011, pp. 126-150.  C. Reus-Smit, The 
Politics of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004; A. Wendt, 
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The same applies to Grünfeld’s methodological arguments. A method is just a 
lens; it does not belong exclusively to any of the disciplines. For example, 
successful quantitative legal studies have been done into sentencing practice33 
as well as qualitative studies into why states accept international tribunals.34 
The puzzle determines the method, not vice versa. Many important questions 
can be (and are) answered by legal scholars with the use of quantitative 
methods, especially when related to wider patterns or evaluation of existing 
practice. At the same time, qualitative social science methods can address 
some issues which can be hardly answered quantitatively. There is no 
impermeable methodological divide, just one that is given by preferences and 
puzzles.  
 
Therefore, I respectfully disagree with Grünfeld’s argument and problematic 
conclusion. Instead of continuation in separate disciplines, substantive and 
methodological interaction between lawyers and international relations 
scholars should be encouraged. Only then we can see the “mutual surprise and 
amazement” (p.14) envisaged by Grünfeld. 
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Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press 1999. 
33 B. Holá, A. Smeulers and C. Bijleveld, 'International Sentencing Facts and Figures: 
Sentencing Practice at the ICTY and ICTR’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 
2011-2, pp. 411-439. 
34 B.A. Simmons and A. Danner, 'Credible Commitments and the International Criminal 
Court', International Organization 2010-2, fn. 11.  
